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SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 The question presented in this appeal from a 
dismissal of a class action is both narrow and novel: Has a 
plaintiff—who has entirely consumed a product that has 
functioned for her as expected—suffered an economic 
injury solely because she now sincerely wishes that she 
had not purchased that product? We hold that such a 
plaintiff has not suffered an economic injury sufficient to 
bring a claim in federal court. More succinctly, buyer’s 
remorse, without more, is not a cognizable injury under 
Article III of the United States Constitution. 
 A plaintiff alleging an economic injury as a result 
of a purchasing decision must do more than simply 
characterize that purchasing decision as an economic 
injury. The plaintiff must instead allege facts that would 
permit a factfinder to determine, without relying on mere 
conjecture, that the plaintiff failed to receive the economic 
benefit of her bargain. Because the plaintiff here has failed 
to plead facts sufficient to establish economic harm, the 
District Court’s judgment will be affirmed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Mona Estrada alleges that a woman’s 
perineal use of Defendant Johnson & Johnson’s Baby 
Powder can lead to an increased risk of developing ovarian 
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cancer. JA 47. Without question, that is a serious 
allegation. Yet the validity of Plaintiff’s epidemiological 
theory is not for this court to decide.1 Nonetheless, 
because Estrada has artfully woven that serious allegation 
into her complaint—despite it having little connection to 
the alleged economic injury that forms the basis of her 
claim—we must begin our discussion by carefully 
describing what this case is not about.  
First, Plaintiff does not allege that a product has 
caused her physical injury.2 Estrada does not allege that 
she has ovarian cancer, nor does she allege even an 
increased risk of developing cancer. Second, this case 
makes no claim of emotional injury. Estrada does not 
allege, for example, that she suffers from a fear of 
                                              
1 “When reviewing an order of dismissal for lack of 
standing, we accept as true all material allegations of the 
complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiff.” 
Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 
288 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. 
Quaker State–Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
2 JA 49–50 (“Plaintiff is not claiming physical harm or 
seeking the recovery of personal injury damages.”). 
Excluded from Estrada’s proposed class definition are 
individuals “who assert claims from personal injury.” JA 
71. 
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someday developing ovarian cancer. Third, this case does 
not involve allegations of a defective product. Estrada 
purchased Baby Powder labeled as being “designed to 
gently absorb excess moisture,” and marketed as being 
able to “keep[] skin feeling soft, fresh and comfortable,” 
and help “reduce the irritation caused by friction.” JA 52. 
She does not allege that her powder failed to adequately 
perform any of these functions.3 Fourth, this case does not 
involve a durable product still in a plaintiff’s possession. 
Instead, the complaint concerns a nondurable product that 
has already been consumed in its entirety.4 Estrada does 
not, for example, seek to be reimbursed for powder that 
she still possesses but cannot use. Finally, this case does 
                                              
3 Nor could Estrada credibly make such an allegation. She 
continued to purchase the powder for approximately six 
decades—presumably because it worked. See JA 49 
(alleging that Estrada purchased Defendant’s baby powder 
“[f]rom about 1950 to sometime in 2013”).   
 
4 By “nondurable,” we refer to a product that is consumed 
rather quickly—such as a gallon of gasoline. By contrast, 
a “durable” product is one that is consumed over a much 
longer period of time—such as a new automobile. A 
plaintiff who, for example, alleged that her automobile 
was at risk of imminently malfunctioning because of a 
particular defect would present a much different question 
than the one at hand.  
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not involve any number of other economic theories that 
might confer Article III standing on other plaintiffs. For 
instance, Estrada does not seek to be reimbursed for 
medical monitoring expenses, nor does she seek to recoup 
transaction costs associated with reselling or returning 
Baby Powder. 
What, then, does Estrada allege? Her theory of 
recovery is simply that she suffered an economic injury by 
purchasing improperly marketed Baby Powder. JA 49. 
According to Estrada, had she been properly informed that 
using Baby Powder could lead to an increased risk of 
developing ovarian cancer, she would not have purchased 
the powder in the first place. JA 49, 70. Characterizing this 
as an economic injury, she seeks relief for herself and a 
class of similarly situated consumers.5 
Estrada first brought this lawsuit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of California. 
JA 46. On March 27, 2015, that court dismissed Estrada’s 
complaint for lack of Article III standing. Estrada Br. 7. 
                                              
5 Estrada seeks certification of a class defined as “All 
persons who purchased [Johnson & Johnson] Baby 
Powder in California and states with laws that do not 
conflict with the laws asserted here.” JA 71. However 
broad this proposed definition, apparently covering even 
men (who are obviously incapable of developing ovarian 
cancer), we are not presented with issues arising under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Estrada then filed an amended complaint, but before the 
Eastern District of California could rule on that complaint, 
the case was consolidated as part of a Multidistrict 
Litigation proceeding and transferred to the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey (the “District 
Court”). JA 44; Estrada Br. 7.  
On July 14, 2017, the District Court dismissed 
Estrada’s complaint without prejudice for lack of Article 
III standing, and granted her leave to amend. JA 5. After 
Estrada informed the District Court that she chose not to 
amend and would stand on her complaint, the District 
Court dismissed the case on August 10, 2017. JA 4. 
In concluding that Estrada did not have Article III 
standing, the District Court explicitly considered whether 
Estrada’s allegations fell within any one of three different 
theories of economic injury: (1) alternative product; (2) 
premium price; and (3) benefit of the bargain. JA 16–17. 
Estrada challenges this tripartite analysis, contending that 
the District Court inappropriately funneled her allegations 
into “one of three assumed damage methodologies.” 
Estrada Br. 7. But Estrada was not restricted to the three 
theories considered by the District Court; she was free to 
present additional theories of her own—particularly by 
amending her complaint when the District Court offered 
her the opportunity to do so. In examining Estrada’s 
complaint through the lens of three different theories of 
injury, the District Court merely fulfilled its duty to 
 8 
 
“examine the allegations in the complaint from a number 
of different angles” in order to see if the “purported injury 
can be framed in a way that satisfies Article III.” 
Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 197 
(3d Cir. 2016).  
Under the alternative product theory, a plaintiff 
might successfully plead an economic injury by alleging 
that, absent the defendant’s conduct, she would have 
purchased an alternative product that was less expensive. 
Under this theory, the economic injury could be calculated 
by determining the difference in price between the 
defendant’s more expensive product and the less 
expensive alternative. Portions of Estrada’s complaint can 
reasonably be read as an attempt to allege this very theory 
of injury. Her complaint states, for example, that had she 
“known the truth about the safety of using [Johnson & 
Johnson’s talc-based Baby Powder], she would not have 
purchased the product,” but instead “would have 
purchased an alternative product containing cornstarch 
instead of talc.” JA 49.6 According to Estrada’s complaint, 
                                              
6 As explained in Estrada’s complaint, Johnson & 
Johnson’s “Baby Powder is made entirely of talc and 
fragrance. Talc is a mineral composed of hydrated 
magnesium silicate that is mined from the earth. It is an 
inorganic material. Talc is used to manufacture goods, 
such as paper making, plastic, paint and coatings, rubber, 
food, electric cable, ceramics, and cosmetics. In its loose 
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“alternative powder products that are cornstarch[-]based . 
. . do not pose a risk of ovarian cancer and are otherwise 
functionally the same as talc products.” JA 54. Upon 
considering these allegations, the District Court concluded 
that Estrada could not avail herself of the alternative 
product theory because she failed “to allege that a 
cornstarch-based product would have been cheaper.” JA 
30. In other words, paying less for Baby Powder than an 
alternative would not constitute an economic injury.  
Under a second theory analyzed by the District 
Court, the premium price theory, a plaintiff may plead an 
economic injury by alleging that the defendant unlawfully 
advertised its product as being “superior” to others. 
Applying this approach, economic injury is calculated as 
the unfair “premium” that the plaintiff was unlawfully 
induced to pay. The District Court concluded that Estrada 
did not sufficiently allege an economic injury under this 
theory because she did not claim that Johnson & Johnson 
“advertised Baby Powder as superior to other products,” 
nor did she allege that “she would not have paid a premium 
for Baby Powder” but for such advertisements. JA 35. In 
other words, Estrada identified no unlawful “premium.” 
Estrada concedes that her claims do not fall within 
either the alternative product or premium price theories of 
economic injury. Estrada Br. 25 (“Estrada’s injury in this 
                                              
form and as used in the Baby Powder, talc is known as 
‘talcum powder.’” JA 54. 
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case does not depend on her ability to purchase an 
alternative product at a cheaper price.”); id. at 26 (“[T]he 
district court’s ‘premium price’ methodology has nothing 
to do with Estrada’s claims.”); Reply Br. 12 (“The District 
Court’s ‘Alternative Product’ and ‘Price Premium’ 
Theories Are Irrelevant”). Indeed, Estrada has failed to 
identify either a cheaper alternative or an unlawful 
premium. Any economic injury she may have suffered, 
then, must be conceptualized by applying some other 
theory of injury. Accordingly, the third theory of injury 
analyzed by the District Court, the benefit of the bargain 
theory, merits our attention.  
Under the benefit of the bargain theory, a plaintiff 
might successfully plead an economic injury by alleging 
that she bargained for a product worth a given value but 
received a product worth less than that value. The 
economic injury is calculated as the difference in value 
between what was bargained for and what was received. 
The District Court concluded that Estrada’s allegations 
also failed to fit within this theory of harm because she 
purchased and received Baby Powder that successfully did 
what the parties had bargained for and expected it to do: 
eliminate friction on the skin, absorb excess moisture, and 
maintain freshness. JA 17–18, 29–30. On appeal, Estrada 
rejects the significance of the Baby Powder performing 
these functions. She contends that although she received 
Baby Powder that eliminated friction on the skin, absorbed 
excess moisture, and maintained freshness, she was also 
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promised that the Baby Powder would be “safe.” Instead, 
Estrada contends, the product was “unsafe.” Estrada Br. 
19–20. We focus, then, on this contention and consider 
whether Estrada has successfully alleged an economic 
injury sufficient to confer Article III standing.7 
II. STANDING JURISPRUDENCE 
Article III of our Constitution vests “[t]he judicial 
power of the United States” in both the Supreme Court and 
“such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III., § 1. While 
Article III does not outline the exact contours of this 
“judicial power,” the Constitution “does specify that this 
power extends only to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) 
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2). In order to avoid 
violating this “Cases and Controversies” limitation, a 
party seeking to invoke the federal judicial power must 
first establish that they have “standing” to do so. Id.8 This 
                                              
7 “We exercise plenary review over a dismissal for lack of 
standing.” Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories, 874 F.3d 154, 
161 (3d Cir. 2017) 
8 Although Article III does not explicitly refer to 
“standing,” the judicial doctrine derives from the principle 
of separation-of-powers. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty 
Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article 
III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers 
principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from 
 12 
 
standing requirement “limits the category of litigants 
empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek 
redress for a legal wrong,” and “ensure[s] that federal 
courts do not exceed their authority as it has been 
traditionally understood.” Id. 
To establish standing, a plaintiff must have “(1) 
suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 
                                              
being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”); 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory 
Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1226 (1993) (“If Congress 
directs the federal courts to hear a case in which the 
requirements of Article III are not met, that Act of 
Congress is unconstitutional. . . . [T]he conclusion that 
Article III limits congressional power can hardly be 
regarded as remarkable.”); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine 
of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983) (“My 
thesis is that the judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial 
and inseparable element of th[e] principle [of separation-
of-powers], whose disregard will inevitably produce—as 
it has during the past few decades—an overjudicialization 
of the processes of self-governance.”). While Estrada 
presents theories of harm that rest upon California law 
rather than a statute enacted by Congress, the 
constitutional limitations imposed on our jurisdiction 
remain the same. Federal courts are not at liberty to opine 
on state law absent Article III jurisdiction. 
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challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. This 
appeal focuses on the “‘[f]irst and foremost’ of standing’s 
three elements,” injury in fact. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). 
Satisfying the injury in fact element requires the party 
seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction to establish three 
sub-elements. Mielo v. Steak ’n Shake, 897 F.3d 467, ___ 
n.11 (3d Cir. 2018). First, the party must “show that he or 
she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest.’” 
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct.  at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Second, the party 
must show that the injury is both “concrete and 
particularized.” Id. Finally, the party must show that his or 
her injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.” Id. 
Because Estrada is the party seeking to invoke 
federal jurisdiction, “[t]he burden to establish standing” 
rests with her. Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 194. Indeed, she 
specifically “bears the burden of showing that [s]he has 
standing for each type of relief sought.” Summers v. Earth 
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (emphasis added). 
Because Estrada seeks relief in the form of (1) monetary 
damages, (2) restitution, and (3) injunctive relief, JA 79, 
our standing inquiry will consider, in turn, whether 
Estrada has established standing to seek these three 
categories of relief.  
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III. MONETARY DAMAGES 
In considering whether Estrada has standing to seek 
monetary damages, we focus our analysis on two recent 
Article III standing opinions from this Court: Finkelman 
v. National Football League, 810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2016), 
and Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories, 874 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 
2017). These precedential opinions represent two sides of 
the same coin. And in each, we considered whether the 
plaintiffs’ theory of economic injury was too conjectural 
to establish standing.  
While in Cottrell we concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
economic theory of harm was based on more than mere 
conjecture, in Finkelman we concluded just the opposite. 
The two holdings can be harmonized, however, to provide 
a clear lesson: a plaintiff must do more than offer 
conclusory assertions of economic injury in order to 
establish standing. She must allege facts that would permit 
a factfinder to value the purported injury at something 
more than zero dollars without resorting to mere 
conjecture. Accordingly, Estrada must do more than 
simply characterize her Baby Powder purchases as 
economic injuries; she must allege facts that would permit 
a factfinder to determine that the economic benefit she 
received in purchasing the powder was worth less than the 
economic benefit for which she bargained. A brief 
description of the holdings in Finkelman and Cottrell 
brings this lesson into focus. 
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In Finkelman, two plaintiffs alleged that the 
National Football League (“NFL”) had a ticketing policy 
of reserving tickets for League Insiders that resulted in 
Super Bowl tickets being priced higher than they would 
have been had the NFL offered to sell more tickets to the 
general public. Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 190. We concluded 
that one of the plaintiffs in that case, Hoch–Parker, had not 
suffered an economic injury sufficient to confer Article III 
standing. Id. at 196. That was because Hoch–Parker had 
not even attempted to purchase Super Bowl tickets; he had 
only considered the possibility of doing so. Id. at 195–96.  
A second plaintiff, Finkelman, presented a closer 
case because he alleged that he had actually purchased 
Super Bowl tickets. Id. at 197. We therefore examined his 
allegations through the lens of two different theories of 
economic injury. Under the first theory, Finkelman alleged 
that the NFL’s ticket policy injured him by preventing him 
from successfully purchasing a ticket at face value in a 
ticket lottery. Id. But because Finkelman never entered 
that lottery, we concluded that this economic theory failed 
to afford a basis for standing. Id. at 199. His failure to even 
attempt to purchase a ticket through the lottery meant that 
“there was always a zero percent chance that he could 
procure a face-price ticket.” Id. at 198. Any economic 
harm that Finkelman might have suffered as a result of not 
purchasing Super Bowl tickets through the lottery was 
therefore not attributable to the NFL’s conduct. Id. 
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Although Finkelman did not participate in the ticket 
lottery, he did allege that he purchased tickets in a 
secondary market where tickets from the lottery were 
resold. Id. at 199. Under a different economic theory, then, 
Finkelman contended that the NFL’s ticket policy inflated 
the price of tickets on the resale market in which he had 
participated. Id. at 199. In particular, Finkelman alleged 
that had the NFL originally released more tickets for sale 
to the general public, there would have been greater 
availability of such tickets on the resale market. Id. at 199–
200. That increase in supply, he claimed, would have 
resulted in a reduction in price. Id.  
Finkelman contended that his economic injury 
could be calculated as the difference between what he 
actually paid, and what he claimed he should have paid 
had the NFL released more tickets to the general public. 
Id. We concluded that this theory failed to provide 
Finkelman with standing, since “League [I]nsiders . . .  had 
the same incentive to resell their tickets as the unnamed 
broker who sold Finkelman his two tickets.” Id. at 200. In 
recognizing that economic incentive, we explained that 
“while it might be the case that the NFL’s withholding [of 
tickets] increased ticket prices on the resale market, it 
might also be the case that it had no effect on the resale 
market.” Id.9  
                                              
9 We further noted that the NFL’s withholding of “tickets 
from the general public . . . might have even increased the 
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In summarizing the issue with Finkelman’s second 
economic theory of injury, we explained that “we have no 
way of knowing whether the NFL’s withholding of tickets 
would have had the effect of increasing or decreasing 
prices on the secondary market. We can only speculate—
and speculation is not enough to sustain Article III 
standing.” Id. Although we noted that courts often “credit 
allegations of injury that involve no more than ‘application 
of basic economic logic,’” Id. at 201 (quoting United 
Transp. Union v. I.C.C., 891 F.2d 908, 912 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 
1989)), we further explained that “there is a difference 
between allegations that stand on well-pleaded facts and 
allegations that stand on nothing more than supposition.” 
Id. Cognizant that “even at the pleading stage, ‘we need 
not accept as true unsupported conclusions and 
unwarranted inferences,’” Id. at 202 (quoting Maio v. 
Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 500 (3d Cir. 2000)), we 
                                              
supply of tickets on the resale market, leading to lower 
prices.” Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 200. This was because 
League Insiders—who might have received their Super 
Bowl Tickets for free—could have been more inclined to 
resell their tickets than members of the general public 
were, since League Insiders could “pocket[] the entire 
resale price of the ticket as profit.” Id. 
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concluded that Finkelman needed to present the court with 
additional facts in order to establish standing.10 
Unlike the economic theories in Finkelman, the 
plaintiffs’ theories in Cottrell were sufficient to establish 
Article III standing. In Cottrell, we held that plaintiffs, 
who purchased prescription eye-drops, had Article III 
standing to sue the manufacturers and distributors of those 
eye-drops. Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 169–70. The plaintiffs 
alleged that “manufacturers and distributors . . . packaged 
[the solution] in such a way that forced [plaintiffs] to waste 
                                              
10 After remand, Finkelman abandoned his first theory of 
economic harm and presented the district court with 
additional facts supporting his second theory. Finkelman 
v. Nat’l Football League, 877 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 
2017). In particular, “Finkelman added facts alleged by . . 
. an economist who specializes in sports and ticketing on 
the workings of secondary ticket markets in events like the 
Super Bowl.” Id. at 509. That economist explained, inter 
alia, “that under the NFL’s current system, NFL insiders 
sell their tickets to a concentrated group of brokers, who 
in turn charge more for tickets on the secondary market. 
Without the NFL withholding, [the economist] posited 
that there would be more fan-to-fan direct sales of tickets, 
cutting out more brokers and allowing for lower prices.” 
Id. Only after the presentation of these additional facts did 
we conclude that Finkelman had Article III standing. Id. at 
513. 
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it.” Id. at 159. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
eye medication could only be dispensed from “unfairly” 
designed bottles that released drops larger than the human 
eye could hold at one time. Id. at 159, 161. 
We concluded that the Cottrell plaintiffs had 
standing only after we conducted an analysis of their 
economic theories—as we did in Finkelman—and 
determined that the Cottrell plaintiffs’ attempt to place an 
economic value on the “wasted” portion of the eye-drops 
was not conjectural. Id. at 168. Estrada attempts to read 
this important limitation out of Cottrell. She contends that 
Cottrell “confirmed that a consumer’s purchase of a 
product based on the manufacturer’s deceptive and unfair 
business practices constitutes injury-in-fact.” Estrada Br. 
2. In so arguing, Estrada overreads our opinion. The 
Cottrell plaintiffs did not have standing simply because 
they purchased a product that a consumer would view as 
flawed. Rather, the plaintiffs had standing only because 
they were unable to use a portion of the eye-drop 
medication they had purchased, and they alleged an 
economic theory that allowed them to value that unused 
portion.11  
                                              
11 Were we to accept Estrada’s argument, one might 
reasonably wonder whether the Cottrell plaintiffs were 
foolish for suing only for the value of the portion of the 
eye-drops that they could not use, rather than suing for the 
value of the entire bottle. But unlike Estrada—who alleges 
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We did not offer lengthy analyses of the various 
economic theories presented in either Finkelman or 
Cottrell because we wished to sound pedantic. We 
conducted those analyses because Article III requires us 
to ensure that plaintiffs present more than merely 
conjectural assertions of injury. Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 
193 (recognizing a “federal court’s obligation to assure 
itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction”).  
Estrada nonetheless contends that, unlike the 
plaintiffs in Finkelman and Cottrell, she is not required to 
offer any economic theory of injury at the pleading stage. 
As her opening brief puts it, “[t]he amount Estrada and 
other members of the class may receive in damages or 
restitution is a different question than whether [she] has 
standing.” Estrada Br. 26. Estrada further promises that, 
“[a]t the appropriate time after discovery,” she will “put 
forth models for calculating damages and restitution that 
are linked to her theory of relief and are based on the 
evidence in the case.” Id. Estrada’s request to indefinitely 
defer what is a pleading obligation is not one we may grant 
and still fulfill our constitutional obligations. 
To start, Estrada’s promise to provide us with a 
means to conceptualize her injury at some future time does 
                                              
an economic injury which includes portions of a product 
that she actually consumed—the Cottrell plaintiffs alleged 
an economic injury consisting of only the “wasted” 
portion of the product. 
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nothing to assist us in determining whether Estrada has 
standing at this stage. Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 202 (“Nor 
are we persuaded by plaintiffs’ counsel’s promises of 
future expert testimony when no facts supporting 
plaintiffs’ theory of injury appear within the four corners 
of the complaint.”). Our standing inquiry is restricted to 
the allegations currently before us.  
In order to allege that she has suffered an economic 
injury as a result of simply purchasing Baby Powder, 
Estrada must allege that she purchased Baby Powder that 
was worth less than what she paid for. This is not to say 
that a plaintiff is required to allege the exact value of her 
economic injury at the pleading stage. Calculating and 
proving damages is indeed one of the major phases of a 
civil trial, and a plaintiff need not develop detailed 
economic models at the pleading stage to establish that she 
has standing.  
But even at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must set 
forth sufficient factual allegations that, if proven true, 
would permit a factfinder to determine that she suffered at 
least some economic injury. Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing 
that establishing an injury in fact requires alleging an 
“identifiable trifle” of injury (quoting Bowman v. Wilson, 
672 F.2d 1145, 1151 (3d Cir. 1982)). The Cottrell 
plaintiffs satisfied this relatively low hurdle by providing 
two theories which valued the “wasted” portion of the 
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medication that they had purchased. Cottrell, 874 F.3d at 
168. One of the plaintiffs in Finkelman accomplished the 
same, after remand, by putting forth analysis by an 
economist who could explain how the NFL’s ticketing 
policy allegedly resulted in increased resale prices. 
Finkelman, 877 F.3d at 509.  
It would not have been enough for the plaintiffs in 
Cottrell and Finkelman to simply allege that, although 
they purchased eye-drops and football tickets at a given 
price, they later wished they had not done so. But that is 
as far as Estrada’s allegations of economic injury go. 
Although “[i]njury-in-fact is not Mount Everest,” 
Danvers, 432 F.3d at 294, it is more than a desert mirage. 
While the evidentiary burdens placed on a plaintiff at the 
pleading stage are minimal, our precedent requires the 
plaintiff to do more than simply pair a conclusory assertion 
of money lost with a request that a defendant pay up.12 
                                              
12 See, e.g., Twp. of Lyndhurst, N.J. v. Priceline.com Inc., 
657 F.3d 148, 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that a 
plaintiff-municipality’s lost tax revenue, which could be 
calculated as the difference between taxes paid on 
“wholesale” rates and taxes paid on “retail” rates, 
constituted an economic injury sufficient to confer Article 
III standing); Danvers, 432 F.3d at 292 (referring to 
complaint language alleging that the Ford Motor 
Company’s conduct required the plaintiffs-dealerships to 
make “very significant out-of-pocket investments to 
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Estrada fails to allege even that the Baby Powder provided 
her with an economic benefit worth one penny less than 
what she paid. We must, therefore, conclude that she 
received the benefit of her bargain and has suffered no 
economic injury.  
But what are we to make of Estrada’s allegations 
that she received only “unsafe” Baby Powder despite 
being promised “safe” Baby Powder? Estrada Br. 19–20. 
                                              
comply with Ford’s requirements,” and further noting that 
“[p]laintiffs even break down the amount of money spent 
per dealership”); see also Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs, 
283 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Merely asking for 
money does not establish an injury in fact.”); O’Neil v. 
Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 504–05 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that “[t]his case is similar to other no-injury 
cases,” and concluding that “[t]he [plaintiffs’ product] 
performs just as it was intended, and thus there is no injury 
and no basis for relief”). But see Mazza v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 595 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiffs 
contend that class members paid more for [a braking 
system]  than they otherwise would have paid, or bought 
it when they otherwise would not have done so, because 
Honda made deceptive claims and failed to disclose the 
system’s limitations. To the extent that class members 
were relieved of their money by Honda’s deceptive 
conduct—as Plaintiffs allege—they have suffered an 
‘injury in fact.’” (citation omitted)). 
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Can we not presume that Estrada would spend more for 
safe powder than she would for unsafe powder? Should we 
further presume that this difference in price constitutes an 
economic injury sufficient to confer Article III standing? 
We cannot do so for at least two reasons—the first based 
in law, and the second based in fact. 
First, such presumptions would turn the standing 
question on its head. It is well-settled law that “[w]e 
presume that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless the 
contrary appears affirmatively from the record.” 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 
(2006); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) (same); 
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 
(1986) (same); King Bridge Co. v. Otoe Cnty., 120 U.S. 
225, 226 (1887) (same); Pennsylvania Family Inst., Inc. v. 
Black, 489 F.3d 156, 164 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); 
Philadelphia Fed’n of Teachers, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 
Local 3, AFL-CIO v. Ridge, 150 F.3d 319, 323 (3d Cir. 
1998) (same); Presbytery of N.J. of Orthodox Presbyterian 
Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same). 
We cannot conclude that we have jurisdiction by 
presuming that Estrada would pay less for unsafe powder 
when she fails to even plead as much. And our refusal to 
leap to such a conclusion is supported by Estrada’s 
apparent desire to continue purchasing Baby Powder in the 
future despite being aware of its alleged health risks. 
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Estrada Reply Br. 2, 18. It is worthy of note that Estrada’s 
desire to continue purchasing Baby Powder is not 
conditioned on the powder being sold at a discounted 
price. In the absence of that condition, we would be hard-
pressed to presume that Estrada wishes to continue to buy 
Baby Powder at anything other than its current market 
price, i.e., the very price she has repeatedly paid for the 
product over the last six decades. 
The second reason we cannot presume that Estrada 
suffered an economic injury by failing to receive “safe” 
powder is factual. Although Estrada contends that Baby 
Powder is “unsafe,” her own allegations require us to 
conclude that the powder she received was, in fact, safe as 
to her. As we described early in this opinion, Estrada did 
not allege that she developed ovarian cancer, nor did she 
allege she is at risk of developing ovarian cancer in the 
future as a result of her Baby Powder use. Estrada’s 
references to Baby Powder being unsafe as to others are 
not relevant to determining whether Estrada has standing 
herself. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (1992) (“[T]he ‘injury in 
fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable 
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be 
himself among the injured.”) (quoting Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972)).13  
                                              
13 The Dissent takes issue with our noting that Estrada 
received Baby Powder that was safe as to her. According 
to the Dissent, Estrada has standing because although she 
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We could not conclude that Estrada has standing 
even if she were to contend that, by “unsafe” powder, she 
meant not only powder that would cause her to develop 
ovarian cancer but also powder that would put her at risk 
of developing ovarian cancer. To be sure, had Estrada 
alleged that she was at risk of developing ovarian cancer, 
she may have established standing based on a theory of 
future physical injury. Because litigants and jurists cannot 
                                              
received safe powder, others allegedly did not. As 
comparative examples, the Dissent refers to a parent who 
purchases organic food that turns out to not be organic, a 
consumer who purchases locksets marketed as being 
“Made in the U.S.A” that ultimately were not so made, and 
an observant Jew who purchases nonkosher meat that was 
improperly labeled as being kosher. But while the Dissent 
might be correct that those hypothetical plaintiffs would 
have standing, Estrada’s case is unlike those examples. 
Instead, Estrada’s claims are similar to those of a parent 
who indeed received organic food, a consumer who indeed 
received locksets domestically made, and an observant 
Jew who indeed received kosher meat—but who wish to 
sue because they claim that other individuals did not 
similarly receive the benefit of their own bargains. 
Although defendants who perform for some consumers 
but not others might be held liable pursuant to other 
mechanisms—by, for example, state attorneys general 
filing suit—Article III does not permit private plaintiffs to 
sue for injuries suffered only by others.  
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predict the future, the law will sometimes permit plaintiffs 
to establish standing based on injuries that are likely to 
occur later in time.  
But Estrada chose not to allege any risk of 
developing ovarian cancer in the future. JA 49–50 
(“Plaintiff is not claiming physical harm or seeking the 
recovery of personal injury damages.”). Given the absence 
of such an allegation, Estrada cannot now claim that she 
was ever at risk of developing ovarian cancer.  
To further illustrate this point, imagine that 
Defendants could go back in time to the 1950s when 
Estrada first purchased Baby Powder. Imagine further that, 
the moment before Estrada purchased that first bottle of 
Baby Powder, Defendants informed her that “although this 
powder might cause others to develop ovarian cancer, we 
have seen the future and we can tell you with absolute 
certainty that there is a zero percent chance that this Baby 
Powder will ever cause you to develop ovarian cancer.” 
Can it be said that a plaintiff with a zero percent chance of 
ever experiencing a harm is at “risk” of experiencing that 
harm? The question answers itself. And because Estrada 
does not allege that she suffered harm through an 
increased risk of developing ovarian cancer, we can 
conclude that the powder Estrada purchased was not 
“unsafe.” 
In sum, although Estrada characterizes her Baby 
Powder purchases as economic injuries for which she is 
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entitled to relief, she has failed to allege that the economic 
benefit she received from that powder was anything less 
than the price she paid. In short, she received the benefit 
of her bargain.14 Today, we therefore explicitly hold what 
                                              
14 To this end, we note that our holding does not conflict 
with the Supreme Court of California’s holding in Kwikset 
Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011), a case 
that Estrada favorably cites. In Kwikset, plaintiffs 
purchased locksets labeled “Made in the U.S.A.,” and 
contended that they suffered an economic injury because 
those locksets contained foreign-made parts. Kwikset, 246 
P.3d at 881. Interpreting a state standing provision 
purporting to reflect Article III’s injury in fact 
requirement, the Supreme Court of California concluded 
that these plaintiffs had suffered an economic harm. Id. at 
885. As the Court wrote, “[f]or each consumer who relies 
on the truth and accuracy of a label . . . the economic harm 
is the same: the consumer has purchased a product that he 
or she paid more for than he or she otherwise might have 
been willing to pay if the product had been labeled 
accurately.” Id. at 890.  
The key language in that quote, as we read it, is the 
language that the Court chose to italicize: that a consumer 
has “paid more” for a product than she otherwise would 
have had it been properly labeled. Id. In analyzing whether 
the plaintiffs “paid more” for their locksets, the Kwikset 
Court noted that “[w]hether or not a party who actually 
received the benefit of his or her bargain may lack 
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might heretofore have been obvious: a plaintiff does not 
have Article III standing when she pleads economic injury 
from the purchase of a product, but fails to allege that the 
purchase provided her with an economic benefit worth less 
than the economic benefit for which she bargained.15 
                                              
standing, in this case, under the allegations of the 
complaint, plaintiffs did not [receive the benefit of their 
bargain].” Id. at 892. Unlike the plaintiffs in Kwikset, who 
failed to receive the benefit of their bargains and thus 
“paid more” for their locksets, Estrada fails to allege the 
same. 
15 Although Koronthaly v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 374 F. 
App’x 257, 258 (3d Cir. 2010) is an unpublished opinion 
and therefore not binding precedent, we find the rationale 
presented in that case to be both persuasive and consistent 
with our holding here. In Koronthaly, the panel considered 
whether a plaintiff had standing to sue a cosmetics 
manufacturer for failing to provide warnings about how 
much lead was in lipstick. Koronthaly, 374 F. App’x at 
258. The plaintiff “did not know when she purchased the 
products that they contained any lead, and when she 
learned of the lead content she immediately stopped using 
them. Moreover, had she known of the lead she would not 
have purchased the products.” Id. These facts are nearly 
identical to the operative facts in this appeal. In holding 
that the plaintiff did not have Article III standing in 
Koronthaly, the panel reasoned that “[a]bsent any 
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IV. RESTITUTION 
In addition to seeking monetary damages, Estrada 
seeks disgorgement of revenues and profit pursuant to the 
law of restitution.16 An examination of Estrada’s 
complaint reveals that her restitution claims are supported 
by only two conclusory assertions. First, Estrada alleges 
that Johnson & Johnson has “been able to sell the product 
for more than [it] otherwise would have had [it] properly 
informed consumers about the safety risks.” JA 48.17 
                                              
allegation that [the plaintiff] received a product that failed 
to work for its intended purpose or was worth objectively 
less than what one could reasonably expect, [the plaintiff] 
has not demonstrated a concrete injury-in-fact.” Id. at 259. 
That same rationale holds true in this case.  
 
16 JA 79 (seeking “restitution and disgorgement of 
Defendants’ revenues” and further asking the District 
Court to direct “Defendants to identify, with court 
supervision, victims of their conduct and pay them 
restitution and disgorgement of all monies acquired by 
Defendants by means of any act or practice declared by 
this Court to be wrongful”). 
   
17 Estrada repeats this same point later in her complaint. 
JA 70 (stating that Johnson & Johnson was “able to charge 
more than [it] otherwise would have had [it] properly 
informed consumers that women who use Baby Powder in 
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Second, Estrada contends that Johnson & Johnson “reaped 
and continue[s] to reap enormous profits from [its] 
deceptive marketing.” JA 70.   
These two statements are nothing more than 
conclusory assertions and are therefore inadequate to 
provide Estrada with Article III standing. See Finkelman 
v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“[W]hen it comes to injury, [Finkelman] looks only to the 
difference between a ticket’s $800 face price and the price 
he paid and says, ‘I have a strong suspicion that this ticket 
would have been cheaper if more tickets had been 
available for purchase by members of the general public.’ 
That claim rests on no additional facts at all. It is pure 
conjecture about what the ticket resale market might have 
looked like if the NFL had sold its tickets differently. 
Article III injuries require a firmer foundation.”).  
As Part III explained, in order to seek monetary 
damages, Estrada must do more than simply characterize 
her purchases as economic injuries. The same rationale 
holds true as to her restitution claims—Estrada cannot 
invoke the federal judicial power simply by asserting that 
Johnson & Johnson has earned unlawful profits. Estrada’s 
conclusory assertions are further weakened by her alleged 
desire to purchase Baby Powder in the future despite 
knowing of its alleged health risks. Estrada Reply Br. 2, 
                                              
the genital area have a significant increased risk of ovarian 
cancer”). 
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18. If Estrada herself wishes to purchase Baby Powder 
whether or not she knows of those health risks, why would 
the same not hold true for other consumers? And if other 
consumers were to purchase Baby Powder whether or not 
they were warned of the alleged health risks, how did 
Johnson & Johnson earn unlawful profits by failing to 
offer such warnings? Estrada’s two conclusory assertions 
provide us not even a hint as to how we might answer these 
basic questions.18 
In sum, Estrada’s restitution claims are based on 
nothing more than mere conjecture. She pleads no facts 
                                              
18 And other questions come to mind. Estrada has observed 
that consumers are already highly informed of the alleged 
health risks associated with Baby Powder given the 
numerous publicly available studies and publications that 
she cites in her complaint. JA 54–67. Estrada’s complaint 
refers to, inter alia, scientific studies from “as early as 
1961,” JA 54, a 1982 New York Times article regarding 
the alleged health risks of talcum powder, JA 67, and a 
pamphlet allegedly distributed “to all ovarian cancer 
patients at nearly every medical facility in the United 
States.” JA 66. Wouldn’t such widespread knowledge 
already have been factored into the current market price of 
Baby Powder? And if so, how did Johnson & Johnson earn 
unlawful profits by withholding information that the 
market might have already taken account of?  
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upon which a factfinder could conclude that Johnson & 
Johnson has been able to sell more Baby Powder than it 
could have had it informed consumers of the alleged health 
risks. We therefore conclude that Estrada lacks standing to 
seek relief in the form of restitution.  
V. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
 Finally, Estrada seeks injunctive relief in the form 
of “corrective advertising” and “enjoining Defendants 
from continuing the unlawful practices” of selling Baby 
Powder without properly warning consumers of the 
alleged health risks. JA 79.19 In order to have standing to 
                                              
19 Estrada also refers in passing to “declaratory” relief 
three times in her complaint. JA 72, 79. All three 
references to “declaratory” relief are made in connection 
with her request for injunctive relief. JA 72 (“declaratory 
and/or injunctive relief”); id. (same); JA 79 (“declaratory 
and injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity”). 
Moreover, her third reference to “declaratory” relief 
appears to include both a reference to injunctive relief and 
relief based in restitution. JA 79 (“Awarding declaratory 
and injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity, 
including enjoining Defendants . . . and directing 
Defendants to identify . . . victims of their conduct and pay 
them restitution and disgorgement.”). Because Estrada’s 
references to “declaratory” relief appear to be a mere 
rehashing of her requests for injunctive relief and 
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seek injunctive relief, Estrada must establish that she is 
“‘likely to suffer future injury’ from the defendant’s 
conduct.” McNair v. Synapse Group Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 
223 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)). Because Estrada makes clear in 
this very lawsuit that she is well aware of health risks 
associated with using Baby Powder, we readily conclude 
that she is not likely to suffer future economic injury. 
 In McNair, we considered whether “former 
customers” of a magazine company had standing to seek 
injunctive relief. Id. at 215. The defendant-appellee in that 
case, a magazine marketing company by the name of 
Synapse Group Inc., had allegedly sold subscriptions in an 
unlawfully deceptive way.20 Because the plaintiffs were 
former customers who were already aware of Synapse’s 
advertising practices, we concluded that any future injury 
                                              
restitution, we need not repeat our standing analyses as to 
those forms of relief. 
 
20 “The majority of Synapse’s magazine subscriptions are 
offered under what is known as a ‘continuous service plan’ 
whereby a customer’s subscription does not expire unless 
and until the customer opts to cancel it. To secure 
subscribers to those plans, Synapse offers introductory 
promotional offers under which customers can receive 
magazine subscriptions for free or at greatly reduced 
rates.” McNair, 672 F.3d at 216. 
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they might suffer as a result of the company’s advertising 
practices was “wholly conjectural.” Id. at 225; see also id. 
at n.13 (“If Appellants’ suggestion is that they may not be 
able to help themselves when confronted with a really 
good subscription offer, they have still not provided a 
basis for standing. Pleading a lack of self-restraint may 
elicit sympathy but it will not typically invoke the 
jurisdiction of a federal court.”). The premise that former 
customers could again be deceived by the very sort of 
advertising practices over which they were already 
pursuing equitable relief was a premise unmoored from 
reality. 
 Estrada has sued Johnson & Johnson for failing to 
warn her of certain health risks. To state the obvious, then, 
she is presently aware of those risks. As with the former 
customers in McNair, we wonder how Estrada could 
possibly be deceived again into buying Baby Powder 
without being aware of those same risks. She is simply not 
at risk of suffering an economic “injury,” and we will not 
give cognizance to this sort of “stop me before I buy 
again” claim. 
Perhaps sensing that McNair presents her with a real 
challenge, Estrada would have us limit McNair to 
instances when plaintiffs do not allege an intention to 
make purchases in the future. Estrada Reply Br. 17–18. 
Because Estrada desires to purchase Baby Powder in the 
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future, she contends that her case can be distinguished 
from McNair. Id. We decline to so limit McNair.  
To begin with, we noted in McNair that “[p]erhaps 
[the former customers] may accept a Synapse offer in the 
future.” McNair, 672 F.3d at 225. Given that recognition, 
it would require a strained reading of the case to conclude 
that the former customers’ failure to allege a desire to 
subscribe in the future played a key role in our analysis. 
Our holding in McNair was instead more focused on the 
crucial fact that the former customers were already aware 
of the allegedly deceptive business practices from which 
they sought future protection. As we wrote in McNair, “the 
law accords people the dignity of assuming that they act 
rationally, in light of the information they possess.” Id. 
That same rationale applies in the case at hand. The law 
affords Estrada the dignity of assuming that she acts 
rationally, and that she will not act in such a way that she 
will again suffer the same alleged “injury.” We conclude 
that Estrada does not have standing to seek injunctive 
relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Estrada contends that other people have suffered 
health complications from using Johnson & Johnson’s 
Baby Powder. Regardless of whether that serious 
allegation has merit, injuries suffered by others do not 
permit us to conclude that Estrada has herself suffered an 
injury in fact. The only injury that Estrada alleges is purely 
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economic in nature—that is, that had she known more 
about Baby Powder, she would not have purchased it in 
the first place. But Estrada’s wish to be reimbursed for a 
functional product that she has already consumed without 
incident does not itself constitute an economic injury 
within the meaning of Article III.  
Estrada fails to provide a non-conjectural basis for 
concluding that she did not receive the benefit of her 
bargain. Estrada similarly fails to show that she is at risk 
of suffering an economic injury in the future, or that 
Johnson and Johnson has sold more Baby Powder than it 
otherwise could have. For these reasons, we conclude that 
Estrada does not have Article III standing to seek any of 
the three forms of relief requested in her complaint. The 
judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.  
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 Juries across the country have returned verdicts finding, 
among other things, that Johnson & Johnson is liable to 
consumers of Johnson’s Baby Powder for its propensity to 
increase the risk of ovarian cancer in women.1  This case is not 
about that.  Mona Estrada, a longtime consumer of Johnson’s 
Baby Powder, makes no claim that she herself experienced a 
higher risk of ovarian cancer due to her use of the product.  
Instead, she alleges that Johnson & Johnson misrepresented 
what it sold her: a product, safe for daily use,that absorbs 
bodily moisture.  She alleges that, had she known that the 
product was not safe, she would not have bought the product.  
 
 The majority is thorough and reaches a conclusion of 
law that, in the abstract, makes perfect sense: a plaintiff who 
receives the benefit of her bargain cannot assert that she has 
suffered an injury-in-fact to establish standing under Article 
III.  I write separately because the majority omits key terms 
from the bargain struck between Estrada and Johnson & 
Johnson to reach the conclusion that Estrada received the 
benefit of her bargain.  In my view, she did not.  I would 
conclude from Estrada’s pleadings that the safety of the 
product—as a general proposition, not specifically as to 
                                              
1 See, e.g., Tiffany Hsu, Johnson & Johnson Told to Pay $4.7 
Billion in Baby Powder Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/business/johnson-
johnson-talcum-powder.html; Tina Bellon, J&J hit with $21.7 
million verdict in another talc asbestos cancer case, REUTERS, 
May 23, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-
johnson-cancer-lawsuit/jj-hit-with-21-7-million-verdict-in-
another-talc-asbestos-cancer-case-idUSKCN1IO3HD. 
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Estrada herself—was an essential component of the benefit of 
Estrada’s bargain.  Because Estrada alleges that the safety of 
the product was part of her bargain and that Johnson & Johnson 
misrepresented this key element, I would hold that Estrada has 
alleged injury-in-fact and standing under Article III.  At this 
stage of the proceedings, all Estrada must allege is an 
“identifiable trifle” sufficient to establish injury-in-fact for 
standing under Article III.2  She has done that.  Thus, I would 
vacate the order of the District Court and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
According to Estrada’s pleadings, Johnson & Johnson 
has encouraged women to dust themselves daily with 
Johnson’s Baby Powder through labeling and advertising.  
Estrada alleges that while the specific language of the label has 
changed over time, its message has remained consistent: “that 
the product is safe for use on women as well as babies.”3  
Historically, the label and advertising has encouraged women 
to dust themselves with Johnson’s Baby Powder daily to mask 
odors.  Under a heading instructing customers when to use 
Johnson’s Baby Powder specifically, the product says: “Use 
anytime you want skin to feel soft, fresh and comfortable.  For 
baby, use after every bath and diaper change.”4 
                                              
2 Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.3d 1145, 1151 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686–90 & 689 
n.14 (1973)). 
3 AA050. 
4 AA053. 
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Johnson & Johnson “seek[s] to convey an image as a 
safe and trusted family brand.”5  It operates a website 
specifically pronouncing “Our Safety & Care Commitment,” 
in which it proclaims that “safety is our legacy” and “[y]ou 
have our commitment that every beauty and baby care product 
from the Johnson & Johnson Family of Consumer Companies 
is safe and effective when used as directed.”6  On its website 
advertising Johnson’s Baby Powder, Johnson & Johnson states 
that the product is “[c]linically proven to be safe, gentle and 
mild.”7  None of the product’s labeling or advertising advises 
of an increased risk of ovarian cancer associated with use of 
Johnson’s Baby Powder.8 
 
The majority does not dispute that Estrada alleges that 
Johnson & Johnson held the product out as safe.  I agree.  The 
majority states that “Estrada’s references to Baby Powder 
being unsafe as to others are not relevant to determining 
whether Estrada has standing herself.”9   
 
I depart from the majority’s reasoning that Johnson’s 
Baby Powder must be unsafe “as to [Estrada]” in order for 
safety to be part of the benefit of Estrada’s bargain.10  In 
support of this proposition, it cites Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, which holds that “the ‘injury in fact’ test requires 
more than an injury to a cognizable interest.  It requires that the 
                                              
5 Id. 
6 Id. (alteration in original). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Majority Op. at 26 (emphasis in original). 
10 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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party seeking review be himself among the injured.” 11  The 
majority’s application of Lujan to exclude “safety as to others” 
from Estrada’s bargain misapplies Lujan and misapprehends 
the nature of Estrada’s injury.  Estrada’s pleading makes it 
clear that Estrada does not allege that she is among those who 
have contracted or who have been exposed to an increased risk 
of contracting ovarian cancer due to her use of Johnson’s Baby 
Powder.  Estrada alleges that her injury was the economic harm 
caused by purchasing a product due to Johnson & Johnson’s 
misrepresentations that the product was safe.  She is, 
undisputedly, among the injured within the meaning of Lujan 
when it comes to the actual basis of her alleged injury-in-fact.  
I believe the Ninth Circuit succinctly stated the requirements 
of Article III as applied to economic harm when it wrote: 
“[W]hen, as here, ‘Plaintiffs contend that class members paid 
more for [a product] than they otherwise would have paid, or 
bought it when they otherwise would not have done so,’ they 
have suffered an Article III injury in fact.”12 
 
 
 
II. 
 
The majority contends that Estrada received the benefit 
of her bargain because it was safe “as to her.”13  This 
improperly confuses the benefit of the bargain relating to 
Estrada’s alleged economic harm with the non-economic 
                                              
11 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992). 
12 Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1104 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2013) (quoting Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 
595 (9th Cir. 2012)) (alteration in original). 
13 Majority Op. at 26 (emphasis omitted). 
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harm—the actual danger allegedly posed by Johnson’s Baby 
Powder—which is not at issue in this case.  
  
What makes a product safe?  If I buy a car of a make 
and model that reportedly explodes when driven, it seems 
obvious that the car is not safe.  But what if I know that the 
specific car that I have purchased, and any subsequent cars of 
that make and model that I purchase, will never explode while 
I am in the car?  The car or cars that I purchase contain the 
same structural defect that makes those cars explode but I, 
through the powers granted to me by legal fiction, know they 
will never explode while I am in the car.  Under the majority’s 
reasoning, this means that the car is safe as to me and, 
therefore, I have conceded that it is safe in any legal action I 
take against the manufacturer for selling a car with an evident 
inclination to explode.  After all, I am totally protected from 
the risk posed by the defect.  But no one would describe the car 
as safe. 
 
When we talk about a product being “safe,” and when 
manufacturers and vendors hold a product out as “safe,” we are 
talking about two related but distinct concepts.  The first is 
exactly what the majority describes: safety as to the immediate 
purchaser.  This is a common conception of safety, the 
consumer who considers the product and asks: “Is this going to 
hurt and/or kill me?”  This form of safety undergirds the claims 
that Johnson & Johnson misrepresented the safety of its 
product brought by plaintiffs who allege that they contracted 
or were exposed to an increased risk of contracting ovarian 
cancer.  It is not at issue here. 
 
But this is not the only form of safety.  The second form 
of safety—the safety that was part of Estrada’s bargain—
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concerns the safety of a product generally, or its safety as to 
others.  The parent who buys a toy for a child considers the 
safety of the toy not necessarily as to him or her but as to the 
child.  A man might buy Johnson’s Baby Powder that will be 
used by a woman with whom he cohabitates, and might very 
well consider the safety of that product as to the other person, 
not to himself.14  In other words, understanding this form of 
safety relies in part on recognizing that the purchaser of a 
product may not be the consumer of a product.  The connection 
need not be that direct, however.  A product is advertised as 
safe for the same reason it is advertised as effective: to induce 
people to purchase it.  A person may rely on various 
representations made by a manufacturer or vendor when 
determining whether to make a purchase. 
 
Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court,15 a case decided by 
the Supreme Court of California, adjudicates standing in light 
of the very statute under which Estrada brings her claims.  It is 
                                              
14 The majority conflates safety as a representation with safety 
as insulation from risk to Estrada specifically, which perhaps 
is why it notes skeptically that men could join Estrada’s 
proposed class.  I leave aside that class certification is well 
beyond the scope of subject-matter jurisdiction.  I also leave 
aside that the putative class action elements of this case are 
entirely separate from whether Estrada herself has standing to 
pursue her claim.  Here, however, the majority again seems to 
forget that Estrada does not allege that she was exposed to the 
danger allegedly posed by Johnson’s Baby Powder.  She 
alleges that Johnson & Johnson’s representations of safety 
were among the terms under which she purchased the product.  
This valuation of safety is not gender-exclusive. 
15 246 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2011). 
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worth noting, though hardly dispositive, that the standing 
requirements of this law are “substantially narrower than 
federal standing under article III, section 2 of the United States 
Constitution.”16  The majority dismisses Estrada’s citation of 
this case because it concerns plaintiffs who did not receive the 
benefit of their bargain (where, purportedly, Estrada has),17 but 
Kwikset is relevant because it illustrates why Estrada did not 
receive the benefit of her bargain.  In Kwikset, plaintiffs 
purchased locksets labeled “Made in U.S.A.” that contained 
parts manufactured abroad.  The defendant made an argument 
that is identical to the majority’s reasoning here: “[C]onsumers 
who receive a fully functioning product have received the 
benefit of their bargain, even if the product label contains 
misrepresentations that may have been relied upon by a 
particular class of consumers.”18 
 
Perhaps illustrating the fundamental simplicity of the 
case before us, the Kwikset court disagreed, stating: 
Plaintiffs selected Kwikset’s 
locksets to purchase in part 
because they were “Made in 
U.S.A.”; they would not have 
purchased them otherwise; and, it 
may be inferred, they value what 
they actually received less than 
either the money they parted with 
or working locksets that actually 
were made in the United States. 
They bargained for locksets that 
                                              
16 Id. at 886. 
17 Majority Op. at 28 n.14. 
18 Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 892. 
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were made in the United States; 
they got ones that were not.19 
The Kwikset court further reasons: 
The observant Jew who purchases 
food represented to be, but not in 
fact, kosher; the Muslim who 
purchases food represented to be, 
but not in fact, halal; the parent 
who purchases food for his or her 
child represented to be, but not in 
fact, organic, has in each instance 
not received the benefit of his or 
her bargain.20 
Estrada has alleged that there was a misrepresentation 
made by Johnson & Johnson as to the safety of Johnson’s Baby 
Powder and, moreover, that the misrepresentation was material 
to her decision to purchase Johnson’s Baby Powder. 
 
At least this stage of the proceedings, where we only 
endeavor to determine whether a plaintiff has standing to 
pursue her claim, I see no reason we should devote ourselves 
to understanding why a plaintiff values what she values.  As 
Kwikset notes: 
This economic harm—the loss of 
real dollars from a consumer's 
pocket—is the same whether or 
not a court might objectively view 
the products as functionally 
equivalent. A counterfeit Rolex 
                                              
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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might be proven to tell the time as 
accurately as a genuine Rolex and 
in other ways be functionally 
equivalent, but we do not doubt the 
consumer (as well as the company 
that was deprived of a sale) has 
been economically harmed by the 
substitution in a manner sufficient 
to create standing to sue. Two 
wines might to almost any palate 
taste indistinguishable—but to 
serious oenophiles, the difference 
between one year and the next, 
between grapes from one valley 
and another nearby, might be 
sufficient to carry with it real 
economic differences in how much 
they would pay. Nonkosher meat 
might taste and in every respect be 
nutritionally identical to kosher 
meat, but to an observant Jew who 
keeps kosher, the former would be 
worthless.21 
I am persuaded by this rationale.  The parent who 
purchases “organic” food that is not organic need not justify 
her decision to purchase food labeled “organic.”  The Kwikset 
plaintiffs were not obliged to explain why they cared if the 
locksets they purchased were manufactured in the United 
States.  It was sufficient that the misrepresentation of the 
manufacturer deprived them of the benefit of their bargain such 
                                              
21 Id. at 890. 
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that they would not have purchased the product had the product 
been labeled accurately.  As courts construing Kwikset have 
stated: “[A] consumer’s subjective willingness to pay more for 
the product than he or she would have been willing to pay in 
the absence of the misrepresentation is itself a form of 
economic injury ‘whether or not a court might objectively view 
the products as functionally equivalent.’”22  That is the same 
scenario presented before us today. 
 
 Estrada effectively alleges that she values “safety” as a 
label, akin to “organic” or “Made in U.S.A.”  When contrasted 
with the real danger allegedly posed by Johnson’s Baby 
Powder, this misrepresentation might seem petty.  However, 
that does not make it immaterial to Estrada’s bargain as she 
alleges it.  
 
III. 
 
The majority invokes two of our recent precedents to 
characterize Estrada’s alleged injury as some attenuated, 
unknowable entity.  The majority’s invocation of Finkelman v. 
National Football League is misplaced.23  Finkelman lacked 
standing because the basis of his alleged injury—the 
purportedly inflated price of Super Bowl tickets—was only 
speculatively affected by the NFL’s conduct.24  Finkelman 
bought his tickets at the inflated price, but did not at that point 
allege a set of facts under which the NFL’s conduct caused the 
                                              
22 Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc., 236 Cal. Rep. 3d 61, 
72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Kwikset, 246 P.3d at 890). 
23 See Majority Op. at 14–18. 
24 Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 200 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (hereafter “Finkelman I”).  
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price inflation.25  Finkelman did not allege that he would not 
have bought the tickets at the inflated price or, more applicably, 
that he would not have bought the tickets had he known that 
the NFL withheld tickets in such a way that the price was 
inflated.  Instead, Finkelman needed to establish with some 
particularity the chain of events that led to his economic injury 
because the injury itself—what money was actually lost—
could not be established without that chain.  The majority 
misapplies Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories similarly, and to the 
same effect.  In Cottrell, the plaintiffs did not dispute that they 
received the benefit of their bargain as to the portion of 
medicine that they were able to use from the dispensers at 
issue.26   
 
The majority correctly notes that we did not analyze the 
economic theories presented in Finkelman and Cottrell 
“because we wished to sound pedantic.”27  We are obliged by 
Article III to ensure that plaintiffs allege injury in fact, not 
conjecture.  In Finkelman, we needed to ascertain that a 
plaintiff who received the benefit of his bargain—tickets to the 
Super Bowl—was in fact injured by being compelled to pay 
more for his tickets because of the improper conduct of the 
seller.  We needed to determine whether the pleadings 
                                              
25 See id.; cf. Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 877 F.3d 
504, 512 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that Finkelman’s amended 
complaint, which alleged “a casual chain justifying why the 
NFL’s withholding set into motion a series of events that 
ultimately raised prices on the secondary market,” alleged 
Article III standing) (hereafter “Finkelman II”). 
26 See Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 169–70 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
27 Majority Op. at 20. 
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established that said compulsion occurred.  In Cottrell, we 
needed to ascertain an injury (and the measurability of that 
injury) where the plaintiffs undoubtedly received the benefit of 
their bargain as to some portion of the medicine that they 
consumed.  More complex theories of injury may be necessary 
where a plaintiff gets the benefit of his or her bargain in some 
of the product, or where the injury might be obscured by layers 
of market forces. 
 
That is not the case here.  Estrada alleges that she paid 
for a product based, in part, on Johnson & Johnson’s 
representation of its safety.  That representation was part of the 
benefit of her bargain.  Because that representation was false, 
Estrada did not receive the benefit of her bargain. 
 
Unlike Finkelman, Estrada need not allege a chain of 
events to show that she paid a price she would not have 
otherwise paid for Johnson’s Baby Powder.  In my view, it 
suffices that she alleges that she would not have purchased the 
product.  The price increase in her bargain with Johnson & 
Johnson caused by the company’s alleged misrepresentation as 
to safety is the total sum she paid for the product.  
 
Unlike the Cottrell plaintiffs, Estrada does not concede 
that she received the benefit of her bargain as to some of her 
purchase—that some of the product was safe as represented by 
Johnson & Johnson.28  Estrada alleges that the whole product 
fails to satisfy the representation of safety made by Johnson & 
Johnson.  If Johnson & Johnson or Estrada can, by expert 
                                              
28 Additionally, for this reason, the majority’s assertion that 
Estrada’s theory of standing would have entitled the Cottrell 
plaintiffs to sue for the contents of the entire bottle is wrong. 
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testimony, demonstrate that only a certain portion of Johnson’s 
Baby Powder is unsafe, that is certainly a question of damages, 
not of injury-in-fact.   
 
Moreover, the majority’s logic is incompatible with 
Cottrell.  After all, the Cottrell plaintiffs used all the medicine.  
Their bargain could be circumscribed just as the majority edits 
the terms of Estrada’s bargain: the Cottrell plaintiffs bargained 
for the benefits of the medicine, not medicine delivered in a 
minimum effective dose so as to maximize the medicine’s 
utility.  But we wisely recognized in Cottrell that the benefit of 
the bargain encompasses the whole bargain, and that the 
bargain should not be redefined to neatly encompass only what 
plaintiffs actually received, instead of what they were 
promised. 
 
IV. 
 
 The majority further holds that Estrada has failed to 
plead facts sufficient to establish standing to pursue restitution 
and to pursue injunctive relief.  I disagree, largely for reasons 
already articulated. 
 
 With respect to restitution, the majority concludes that 
Estrada only makes conclusory allegations that Johnson & 
Johnson sold Johnson’s Baby Powder for more money than it 
would have made had it disclosed the alleged risk of ovarian 
cancer.  In this case, I would rely on the precedent of this Court 
that “federal courts typically credit allegations of injury that 
involve no more than application of basic economic logic.”29  
                                              
29 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 201 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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Dealing only with the allegations of the pleadings, it seems 
sufficiently elementary that a product held out as safe will 
command a higher price than a product held out as markedly 
increasing a woman’s risk of developing ovarian cancer.  As 
such, I believe Estrada has alleged that Johnson & Johnson 
profited from its allegedly unlawful misrepresentation. 
 
 With respect to injunctive relief, I do not read Estrada’s 
allegation as in fundamental tension with McNair v. Synapse 
Group Inc.30  I read Estrada’s allegations about desiring to 
purchase the product as inextricable from the bargain she 
struck with Johnson & Johnson.  While the majority reads her 
pleadings to state that Estrada is willing to purchase the 
product as-is, given her allegations it makes more sense to 
understand that Estrada’s pleaded desire to purchase baby 
powder in the future is contingent on Johnson & Johnson 
offering a product that meets the terms of her bargain.  She is 
only unlikely to suffer future economic injury if we presume 
that Johnson & Johnson has lied and will continue to lie in its 
labeling, or that Estrada will assume that any label offered by 
Johnson & Johnson is untruthful. 
 
Moreover, I believe plaintiffs alleging harm caused by 
defendants’ misrepresentations are entitled to seek injunctive 
relief against those misrepresentations, in part because that is 
explicitly permitted under California’s Unfair Competition 
Law under which Estrada sues.31  A plaintiff who is 
sufficiently aware of misrepresentations and who alleges 
injury-in-fact under a theory of economic harm, or any theory 
of harm, is unlikely to continue purchasing that product as 
                                              
30 672 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2012). 
31 See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. 
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offered beforehand.  If our reasoning compels us to interpret 
Article III to effectively strike down a provision of state law, 
and the law of a state not within this Circuit, I believe we have 
erred. 
 
V. 
 
Article III standing is the minimum hurdle that a 
plaintiff must meet to bring her claim in federal court.  To 
conclude here that Estrada has pleaded standing, we need not 
and, in fact, cannot determine whether she has stated a claim 
sufficiently to withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  We cannot address whether 
this claim as pleaded establishes a sufficient basis for class 
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  As 
previously stated, our only duty here is to determine whether 
Estrada alleged an “identifiable trifle” sufficient to establish 
injury-in-fact for standing under Article III.32  Because Mona 
Estrada has met that bare minimum requirement, I respectfully 
dissent.  I would vacate the District Court’s order and remand 
for further proceedings. 
                                              
32 Bowman, 672 F.3d at 1151 (citation omitted). 
